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The Bank of Korea’s policy response 
to the global financial crisis 
Hee Chun Chung1 
1.  The impact of the global financial crisis on the Korean economy 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the financial and foreign 
exchange markets in Korea were thrown into turmoil. The real economy also shrank rapidly 
under the impact of the international financial market unrest and worldwide recession. 
The Korean won (KRW) plummeted against major currencies because of the outflow of 
foreigners’ investment funds and the deterioration of foreign currency borrowing conditions 
for domestic banks. As worries about credit risk mounted, credit crunches emerged in the 
financial markets. 
The Korean won fell by 28.0% against the US dollar (from KRW/USD 1,089.0 at end-August 
2008 to KRW/USD 1,513.0 on 24 November 2008), and the credit default swap premium 
marked a six-fold surge (from 116 basis points (bp) at end-August 2008 to 675 bp on 
27 October 2008). 
The credit spread on corporate bonds widened almost threefold,2 and stock prices on the 
Korean stock price index (KOSPI) fell by 36.3% (from 1,474.2 at end-August 2008 to 938.8 
on 24 October 2008). 
The scale of the increase in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans shrank to a 
fifth of its previous level (from KRW 10.3 trillion in Q3 2008 to KRW 2.2 trillion in Q4 2008). 
Domestic economic activity shrank by its greatest percentage since the 1997–98 foreign 
currency crisis (Q1 1998, –7.8%) as GDP growth registered a decrease of 5.1% in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 owing to the steep fall in exports and the sharp contraction of domestic 
demand. There was also a large-scale increase in unemployment (from 3.1% in August 2008 
to 4.0% in March 2009). 
2.  The Bank of Korea’s policy response  
Reduction of the base rate 
The Bank of Korea (BoK) lowered its base rate3 on six occasions between October 2008 and 
February 2009, by 3.25 percentage points altogether from 5.25% to 2.00%, the lowest level 
since the policy rate target began to be announced in May 1999. 
                                                
1  Director General, Monetary Policy Department, Bank of Korea. 
2  Corporate bond (AA–, three-year) yields – treasury bond (three-year) yields: from 157 bp at end-August 2008 
to 465 bp on 9 December 2008. 
3  The base bate, ie the policy rate which the Monetary Policy Committee decides on every month, is the 
reference rate applied in transactions between the BoK and counterpart financial institutions such as 
repurchase transactions and liquidity adjustment loans and deposits. 
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Figure 1 
The Bank of Korea base rate1 
1
2
3
4
5
6
2005.1 2006.1 2007.1 2008.1 2009.1
1
2
3
4
5
6(%)
(Oct.11, 2005)(Dec.8)
(Feb.9, 2006)
(Aug.10)(Jun.8)
(Jul.12, 2007)
(Aug.9) (Aug.7, 2008)(Oct.9)
(Oct.27)
(Nov.7)
(Dec.11)
Base Rate
(%)
(Jan.9, 2009)
(Feb.12)
 
1  The overnight call rate target, until February 2008. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
Expansion of liquidity supply 
The BoK supplied liquidity totalling KRW 18.5 trillion (equivalent to around 28.5% of reserve 
money as of end-2008) by means of open market operations to ensure the seamless 
circulation of funds in the money and bond markets. In addition, by way of support for the 
setting up of a Bond Market Stabilisation Fund capitalised at KRW 5 trillion, the BoK provided 
KRW 2.8 trillion. 
The BoK included bank debentures and certain government agency bonds as the securities 
eligible for use in open market operations, which originally included only treasury bonds, 
government-guaranteed bonds and monetary stabilisation bonds. The eligible counterparties 
for repurchase (RP) operations were also extended from the previous focus on banks 
(19 banks and two securities companies) to include an additional 12 securities companies. 
Support for the expansion of banks’ credit supply capacity 
To facilitate the supply of credit through banks, the BoK took various measures, such as 
raising its aggregate credit ceiling, paying banks’ interest on their required reserve deposits, 
and helping banks to build up their capital. 
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Figure 2 
Adjustment of the aggregate credit ceiling 
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Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
To increase the incentives for banks to lend to SMEs, the aggregate credit ceiling was raised 
by more than 50% (from KRW 6.5 trillion in November 2008 to KRW 10 trillion in March 
2009). In order to help banks expand their credit supply by raising their BIS capital adequacy 
ratios, the BoK paid them one-off interest of KRW 0.5 trillion on their required reserve 
deposits. The BoK also provided KRW 3.3 trillion for the formation of a KRW 4 trillion Bank 
Recapitalisation Fund. This fund supported the enhancement of banks’ equity capital through 
the purchase of related subordinated debt and hybrid bonds. 
Actions taken to stabilise the foreign exchange market 
The BoK undertook timely and effective actions to contain foreign exchange market unrest at 
an early stage and avoid it escalating into a foreign exchange crisis. 
The BoK entered into a USD 30 billion swap arrangement with the US Federal Reserve and 
a 180 billion yuan/KRW 38 trillion swap arrangement4 with the People’s Bank of China. The 
BoK also expanded the ceiling of an existing currency arrangement with the Bank of Japan 
from USD 3 billion equivalent to USD 20 billion equivalent.5 
                                                
4  This is separate from the existing currency swap arrangement already entered into under the framework of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI). 
5  Apart from the currency swap arrangement within the framework of the CMI, the BoK and the Bank of Japan 
also entered into a bilateral won-yen currency swap for a non-crisis situation, the ceiling of which was 
expanded in December 2008. 
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Table 1 
Currency swap arrangements between the BoK and other central banks 
 US Federal Reserve People’s Bank of China Bank of Japan 
Ceiling USD 30 billion 180 billion yuan USD 20 billion equivalent 
Date of announcement 30 October 2008 12 December 2008 12 December 2008 
Expiry date 1 February 20101 3 years 1 February 20102 
1  The original expiry date was set at 30 April 2009, but the term of the swap arrangement was extended by six 
months (3 February 2009) and by a further three months (26 June).    2  The original expiry date was set at 
30 April 2009, but the term of the swap arrangement was extended by six months (31 March 2009) and by a 
further three months (16 October). 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
The BoK provided a total of USD 26.6 billion in foreign currency liquidity to banks 
experiencing difficulties in raising overseas funding. Approximately USD 10 billion from the 
BoK’s foreign reserves was provided to the swap market by way of competitive auction. In 
addition, a cumulative USD 16.4 billion was supplied through the competitive auction loan 
facility using the proceeds of currency swaps with the US Federal Reserve. 
Besides these programmes, the BoK introduced the Foreign Currency Loans Secured by 
Export Bills Purchased scheme in order to provide incentives for banks to be active in 
handling trade financing for SMEs. 
 
Table 2 
Bank of Korea foreign currency liquidity supply 
(in USD billions) 
 Plan Supply Period (numbers) 
Competitive auction  
Swap facility 
10 10.3 
21 October to 16 December 
2008 
(7 occasions) 
Competitive auction  
Loan facility 
301 16.3 
2 December 2008 to 20 January 
2009 
(5 occasions) 
Foreign currency loans 
secured by export bills 10 0.2 
10 December 2008 to 25 
February 2009 
(7 occasions) 
Total 50 26.8  
1  The ceiling for the swap arrangement between the BoK and the US Federal Reserve. 
Source: Bank of Korea. 
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3.  The current Korean economic situation 
Financial and foreign exchange markets 
Since Q2 2009 the Korean financial and foreign markets have been quickly regaining 
stability, while a progressively more pronounced recovery trend has also been apparent in 
the real sector.  
With the waning of credit risk fears, the spread6 between high quality (at least A rated) 
corporate bonds and treasury bonds has narrowed to its level prior to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. 
However, the credit spreads7 on sub-investment grade corporate bonds (BBB and lower) still 
remain at a high level, so the situation of credit differentiation persists. 
Figure 3 
Bond yields and credit spreads 
 
1)  Compared to treasury bonds (3-year). 
Source: Bank of Korea; Koscom Corp. 
 
As regards the issuance of corporate bonds, although only top paper could be issued 
immediately after the failure of Lehman Brothers, there has recently been a substantial 
increase in the issuance of subprime corporate bonds.8 
Stock prices (KOSPI) rose sharply from March 2009 onwards amid increasing anticipation of 
a recovery of business activity and foreigners’ sustained, large-scale net purchase position. 
Consequently, KOSPI registered its highest level for the year to date of 1,719 points on 
                                                
6  Corporate bonds (AA–, 3-year) yields − treasury bonds (3-year) yields: from 157 bp at end-August 2008 to 
465 bp on 9 December 2008 and 111 bp at end-November 2009. 
7  Corporate bonds (BBB–, 3-year) yields – treasury bonds (3-year) yields: from 450 bp at end-August 2008 to 
876 bp on 4 February 2009 and 726 bp at end-November 2009. 
8  Weight of subprime corporate bonds: from 0.2% in December 2008 to 14.0% in August 2009 to 20.3% in 
September 2009 and 32.5% in October 2009. 
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22 September 2009. In recent weeks, wide fluctuations have persisted under the burden of 
the sharp rise that occurred within a short period of time. 
Foreign investors’ net purchases reached KRW 30.2 trillion from March to November 2009. 
As a result, the foreign share in total Korean stock market capitalisation moved higher than 
prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers (from 28.9% at end-August 2008 to 25.7% on 14 
April 2009 and to 30.5% at end-November 2009).  
Figure 4 
KOSPI and foreigners’ net share purchases 
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Source: Korea Exchange. 
 
The extent to which Korean stock prices have recovered lost ground (115.2%) stands at a 
high level compared with global markets (MSCI Global: 70.2%) and emerging markets (MSCI 
EM: 99.4%). 
 
Table 3 
Stock prices 
 End-August 2008 
Lowest point 
after the crisis1 
End-November 
20092 Recovery ratio
3 
Korea KOSPI 1,474.2 938.7 (–36.3) 1,555.6 (+65.7) 115.2 
MSCI Global 1,344.9 688.6 (–48.8) 1,149.0 (+66.9) 70.2 
MSCI EM 956.3 454.3 (–52.5) 953.1 (+109.8) 99.4 
1  ( ) represents the rate of recovery of the level at end-August 2008 (%).    2  ( ) represents the percentage 
increase compared to the lowest point.    3  (end-November 2009 – the lowest point after the start of the 
crisis)/(end-August 2008 – the lowest point after the start of the crisis). 
 
In the foreign exchange market, the Korean won has appreciated against major currencies 
thanks to the continuing current account surpluses (cumulative surplus February–October 
2009, USD 37.3 billion) and to the net inflows of foreign portfolio investment funds. There has 
also been a marked improvement in foreign currency borrowing conditions for domestic 
banks. 
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Figure 5 
Exchange rate and CDS premium1 
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1  Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund bonds, 5-year maturity. 
Source: Korea Money Brokerage Corp; Bloomberg. 
 
The credit default swap (CDS) premium9 now stands at a lower level than prior to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, marking 106 bp as of end-November 2009. 
The Korean won traded at 1,162.8 won to the US dollar as of end-November 2009. This 
represented a 35.0% appreciation of the Korean won against the US dollar from its lowest 
point (2 March 2009, 1,570.3 KRW/USD) following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but it 
has not yet returned to the level prior to the onset of the crisis (end-August 2008,1,089.0 
KRW/USD). 
Similarly, domestic banks’ foreign currency borrowing conditions have greatly improved, as 
rollovers of borrowings are proceeding smoothly and premium interest rates are steadily 
declining. Consequently, the foreign currency liquidity support provided to them by the BoK 
has been consistently redeemed. 
Real economy and prices 
In the real economy, the GDP growth rate was 2.6% (quarter-on-quarter) for Q2 2009, and 
rose even higher, reaching 3.2% in Q3 2009 thanks to the continued recovery of exports and 
a constant increase in domestic consumption. 
                                                
9  It stood at 116 bp at end-August 2008, compared to 675 bp on 27 October 2008 and 106 bp on 30 November 
2009. 
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Figure 6 
GDP growth rate 
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Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
The rate of consumer price increases remained stable within the inflation target range (2.5–
3.5%), as demand-side pressures were weak owing to the economic downturn, and 
international oil prices remained lower than in the previous year. 
Figure 7 
CPI and core inflation 
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Source: Bank of Korea. 
 
House prices regained an upward trend from April 2009, having fallen only slightly in spite of 
the financial crisis. House prices in major developed nations such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom fell by 20–30% compared to their peak levels, and their downward trend 
has persisted or exhibited only a very slight uptick. In contrast, house prices in Korea shifted 
to an upward trend after marking a decline of 2.1%. As of end-October 2009, the prices of 
apartments for reconstruction in the three Gangnam districts in Seoul were hovering above 
their September 2008 pre-Lehman Brothers levels. 
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Recently, however, the rise in house prices appears to have faltered somewhat, due to the 
prudential regulation of financial institutions by the government, including the extended 
application of debt-to-income (DTI) regulations. 
Figure 8 
House prices1 and mortgage loans1, 2 
 
1  Compared with the previous month.    2  On the basis of commercial and 
specialised banks. 
Source: Bank of Korea; Kookmin Bank. 
4.  Assessment of the Bank of Korea’s policy response 
The steps taken by the BoK following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 
are considered to have played a very important role in stabilising the financial and foreign 
exchange markets and are accelerating the recovery of business activity. 
In terms of timeliness, the BoK contributed to bringing a prompt halt to the spread of financial 
instability by putting in place the majority of its countermeasures immediately after the onset 
of the crisis. In particular, considering that the fiscal expansion policies could only fully come 
into effect from the beginning of 2009, the monetary policy response in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis is thought to have played a vital role in lessening the impact on the 
economy. The foreign currency liquidity supply schemes worked as a firewall, preventing the 
worsening overseas funding conditions from evolving into a currency crisis, and contributed 
to Korea maintaining its international credibility. For example, international credit rating 
agencies, such as Standard & Poors, unanimously endorsed the BoK’s and the 
government’s10 foreign currency liquidity supply measures as swift and adequate 
immediately after their announcement (17–21 October 2008) and maintained their current 
sovereign ratings for Korea. 
                                                
10  The government (Foreign Exchange Stabilisation Fund) also announced its own foreign currency liquidity 
supply measures amounting to USD 10 billion through swap trading, USD 14 billion through competitive 
auction loans, and USD 11 billion through support for trade finance, totalling USD 35 billion altogether. An 
additional USD 27.4 billion was supplied through the Export-Import Bank of Korea. 
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In terms of policy responses, advanced economy central banks have employed a wide array 
of unconventional measures. However, the BoK sought to minimise any negative side effects 
principally by making use of conventional policy instruments, such as the reduction of interest 
rates and the expansion of liquidity by means of loans and open market operations. 
Efforts were also directed as far as possible in employing these conventional policy 
instruments in order to prevent them from becoming deeply entrenched. The expansion of 
liquidity, which was supplied principally through the purchase of long-term RPs (up to a 
91-day maturity), has been withdrawn seamlessly at the maturity. Similarly, the extension of 
the securities eligible for use in open market operations was subject to a sunset clause. 
The entry into currency swap agreements with the central banks of several major countries 
including the United States was extremely useful, not just in terms of resolving the foreign 
currency liquidity shortage problem but also in restoring investor confidence at home and 
abroad. The establishment of the currency swap arrangements themselves actually had a 
positive announcement effect in stabilising the financial market, as price variables have 
shown rapid recoveries, not just in Korea but also in countries experiencing similar financial 
unrest. The importance of international cooperation has been underlined through the 
response to the global shock of the financial crisis. 
5.  Future policy tasks 
First, the simple interest rate policy and the unconventional measures taken as part of the 
response to the crisis need to be unwound step by step. If the stance of financial easing is 
unwound too rapidly, there is a concern that it could hamper the recovery of activity, and if it 
is not possible to shift to a pre-emptive policy stance, there is a high risk of asset bubbles 
and inflation. Pursuing exit strategies incrementally with appropriate timing while keeping an 
eye on the extent of the improvement in, and sustainability of, global financial and economic 
circumstances would therefore be the preferable course of action. It is also vital to strengthen 
communication efforts such as adequate advanced signalling to economic agents in order to 
minimise adverse impacts. 
Second, monetary policy should take account of the expansion of credit and movements in 
asset prices in order to avoid a repetition of the financial crisis. In setting the policy rate, 
aside from the focus on prices and growth, greater attention should be given to credit 
conditions and movements of asset price variables such as real estate and share prices. 
Third, international cooperation should be strengthened in order to counter the risk of the 
spread of advanced country economic unrest to emerging market countries and the risk of a 
sudden stop. For the Korean economy, foreign exchange market stability has improved greatly 
compared to the situation prevailing in 1997 during the foreign currency crisis, helped by the 
stability-oriented focus of macroeconomic policies and the building up of foreign exchange 
reserves. However, additional efforts are still required in view of the capital exodus and the 
foreign exchange market unrest experienced following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
In particular, considering today’s financial environment in which capital movement between 
countries has greatly expanded because of the globalisation of finance and economic 
activity, it is important to strengthen international policy cooperation with regard to the 
regulation of capital movements to overcome the problem of “original sin”10 of emerging 
market countries. 
Given that advanced country capital flows can heighten the volatility of financial markets and 
the real economies of emerging market countries, discussions concerning the regulation of 
advanced countries’ hedge funds and the international regulation of both multinational 
financial institutions and the supervisory system should be expanded to incorporate the 
opinions of emerging market countries. 
